The Aegis BMD Global Enterprise by Hicks, Brad et al.
Naval War College Review
Volume 65
Number 3 Summer Article 6
2012




Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hicks, Brad; Galdorisi, George; and Truver, Scott C. (2012) "The Aegis BMD Global Enterprise," Naval War College Review: Vol. 65 :
No. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/6
THE AEGIS BMD GLOBAL ENTERPRISE
Rear Admiral Hicks, USN (Ret.), former command-
ing officer of the Aegis cruiser USS Cape St. George 
(CG 71) and former Program Director, Aegis BMD, 
is Vice President, Naval Surface Radars, Lockheed 
Martin MS2. Captain Galdorisi, USN (Ret.), is di-
rector of the Corporate Strategy Group at the Space 
and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific. Dr. Tru-
ver is Director, National Security Programs, Gryphon 
Technologies LC. He also serves on the editorial board 
of the Naval War College Review.
Naval War College Review, Summer 2012, Vol. 65, No. 3
A “High End” Maritime Partnership
Brad Hicks, George Galdorisi, and Scott C. Truver
or more than three decades, beginning soon after the end of World War II, the 
United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other. The concept 
of “mutual assured destruction”—MAD, the U.S. threat of massive retaliation 
to a Soviet first strike—became America’s Cold War de facto strategic defense 
policy. In March 1983, however, President Ronald Reagan asked whether ballistic 
missiles could be destroyed before they reached the United States or its allies, 
thus catalyzing efforts for a national ballistic-missile-defense program that would 
undermine the need for MAD. That same year, the U.S. N avy commissioned USS 
Ticonderoga (CG 47), the first of what is to become a fleet of more than eighty 
Aegis warships. In 2012, these trends have converged, and Aegis ballistic-missile 
defense (BMD) is an increasingly important component of a robust national 
BMD System (BMDS).
National BMDS has morphed from President Reagan’s original vision of a 
system to deter and, if necessary, defeat Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) to one focused on deterring or defeating shorter-range ballistic missiles 
fired at the United States or its allies and friends by 
rogue nations or terrorist groups. So too the “pillars” of 
the national BMDS have changed. As other air, ground, 
and space pillars have advanced in fits and starts, and 
as related programs have been initiated and, some-
times, canceled, the seaborne component of national 
BMDS has become an increasingly central component 
of U.S. regional ballistic-missile defenses. Aegis BMD is 
now moving toward a role in the defense of the Ameri-
can homeland as well. 
F
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As more countries—many with hostile intentions toward U.S. allies in the 
Asia-Pacific region and Europe—have acquired the requisite technologies during 
the past three decades, many U.S. friends and allies have been obliged to contend 
with the threat of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). In northwest Asia, both Japan and Korea have built or are building 
Aegis BMD-capable ships. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in 
Europe have been dealing with ballistic-missile defense through the alliance’s 
Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) program and, since 
2009, also through the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), comprising 
“Aegis Afloat” and “Aegis Ashore.”
This new approach now also includes forward-basing four Aegis BMD-
capable warships in Rota, Spain. “With four Aegis ships at Rota, the alliance is 
significantly boosting combined naval capabilities in the Mediterranean, and 
enhancing our ability to ensure the security of this vital region,” Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta noted on 5 October 2011.1 
These ships will also support NATO’s critical efforts to build effective missile defense. 
Alongside important agreements that were recently concluded with Romania, Poland, 
and Turkey, Spain’s decision represents a critical step in implementing the European 
Phased Adaptive Approach. The United States is fully committed to building a missile 
defense capability for the full coverage and protection of all our NATO European 
populations, their territory and their forces against the growing threat posed by bal-
listic missiles.  
Today the steady growth of Aegis-capable ships in the U.S. Navy—as well as an 
increasing number of world navies fielding such ships—presents new opportu-
nities and challenges. The portion of the Navy’s fleet that is capable of ballistic-
missile defense is increasing from twenty-one ships now to a planned ninety-four 
in 2024.2 Given the well-publicized demand for these assets, Aegis BMD unques-
tionably is becoming an increasingly important component of BMD planning 
and operations of the unified commands’ combatant commanders. 
But some are questioning whether the Navy can afford to see multimission 
Aegis BMD ships abandon general-purpose, Navy-specific missions—such as air, 
surface, and subsurface defense and precision strike for carrier and expedition-
ary strike groups—to support the combatant commanders directly with their 
BMD capabilities.3 Some view Aegis BMD through the same lens as they would 
the strategic ballistic-missile submarine program and ask whether Aegis BMD 
is a mission the nation needs but the Navy cannot afford. However, Aegis BMD 
is an increasingly important element of the nation’s maritime strategy, and it 
differs from the ballistic-missile submarine in a way that enables Aegis BMD to 
satisfy both combatant-commander ballistic-missile-defense demands and Navy 
general-purpose requirements.4
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Moreover, the Navy and the nation have an opportunity to leverage more fully 
Aegis BMD capabilities to provide territorial defense as well as protection of co-
alition naval task forces. The vision, first expressed in 2005, of a former Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, of a “thousand-ship navy”—now 
transformed into a Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), in which nations and 
navies increasingly work together to ensure security of the global commons—is 
reaching fruition as the U.S. Navy works with increasing regularity with coalition 
partners in global and regional partnerships. Because some of these countries are 
acquiring Aegis-equipped ships, a nascent “Aegis Global Enterprise” is evolving, 
in which navies work together to capitalize on the capabilities of these ships for 
integrated fleet air defense and even ballistic-missile defense.
The vast majority of GMP missions, however, have been on the “low end” of, 
or completely outside, the “kill chain”—target identification, dispatch of forces, 
decision and order to attack, and destruction of the target. Such tasks as hu-
manitarian assistance, disaster relief, and antipiracy patrol dominate the shared 
mission set. With the increasing threat of ballistic missiles that can be armed with 
WMD, however, the Aegis BMD capabilities present in the navies of U.S. allies 
and friends can now provide the Global Maritime Partnership with a means to 
address the “high end” of the kill chain with combined, coordinated, ballistic-
missile defense: the Aegis BMD Global Enterprise.
This potential is already manifest in the Asia-Pacific region in the close work-
ing relationship between the United States and Japan. Korea and Australia could 
well join this Aegis network soon, giving the four governments the means to ad-
dress not only territorial BMD but also coordinated BMD of fleet units operating 
together. In Europe, plans are well along to provide robust territorial defense of 
European nations with ALTBMD and the EPAA. Together, these systems provide 
a nascent BMD capability today and promise an even more robust capability as 
the EPAA evolves over the next decade and a half.
But as demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Libya, NATO and the 
nations of Europe have equities often well beyond the territorial boundaries of 
the European continent. Also, a European military deployed beyond Europe’s 
borders will always have a naval component. This is therefore a propitious time 
to begin to link European allies more completely into an Aegis BMD Global En-
terprise in much the same way the U.S. Navy is linked to its Asia-Pacific partners
—Japan today, Korea soon, and thereafter Australia in the near future—in a high-
end Aegis BMD Global Maritime Partnership. 
A BMD IMPERATIVE 
The need for effective BMD has increased in the twenty-first century. More than 
thirty countries deploy ballistic missiles today, compared with only nine in 1972.5 
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Potential enemies possess both ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and today’s rogue leaders view WMD as weapons of choice, not of last 
resort. In 2007, the last year for which complete records are available, potential 
adversaries launched 120 ballistic missiles in tests and demonstrations. These 
foreign ballistic-missile launchings, especially in the short-to-intermediate-range 
category, occurred particularly in the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, 
and Iran. 
The broadened ballistic-missile threat, moreover, crosses strategic-, operational-, 
and tactical-level boundaries. Since the inception of U.S. BMD systems in the 
late 1980s, the main driver of their current versions—including Aegis BMD—
has been the threat posed by rogue nations like Iran and North Korea. Today, it 
is Iran’s organic missile development that poses perhaps the most immediate, 
technically developed threat to the interests of the United States and its allies and 
friends. Several midrange Iranian ballistic missiles have been launched over the 
past several years.6 In 2011, Tehran launched numerous ballistic missiles dur-
ing its GREAT PROPHET exercise. Some of these missiles were capable of striking 
American bases in the region as well as Israel, the Arabian Gulf states, and Turkey. 
The threat from Iran’s ballistic-missile developments takes on new urgency 
when juxtaposed with that nation’s WMD program. Then–CIA director Leon 
Panetta warned in 2010 that it could be a mere two years before Iran was able to 
threaten other states with nuclear warheads mounted on ballistic missiles.7 Like-
wise, the Defense Intelligence Agency has reported that Iran could field a WMD-
armed ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.8 Coupled with its 
determination to acquire WMD, it is Iran’s missiles that pose the gravest threat 
to U.S. and allied interests and to Middle Eastern, South Asian, and European 
allies—an assessment underscored by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
in November 2011.9
Ballistic-missile threat planning at both the regional and strategic levels must 
also take into account the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which already 
has conducted a nuclear weapon test. North Korea possesses a growing ballistic-
missile force that includes short-range Scud C, medium-range No Dong, and 
intermediate-range Taepo Dong 1 missiles, some of which have been transferred 
to other nations as well. South Korean defense minister Kim Kwan-Jin told his 
country’s parliament in June 2011 that North Korea may have already developed 
nuclear warheads small enough for ballistic-missile payloads. Likewise, former 
U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates in 2011 said that North Korea’s missiles and 
nuclear weapons would pose a threat to the United States within five years.10 
The actual pace of Iranian and North Korean intercontinental-range weapon 
development is still the subject of debate, at least in open sources. There is no 
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doubt, however, that the ballistic-missile threat at the regional or theater level is 
burgeoning. As the then director of the Joint Integrated Missile and Air Defense 
Organization, Rear Admiral Archer Macy, told a congressional subcommittee, 
“Congress and our warfighters have said the most pressing threat for our de-
ployed forces today is the increasing number of Short Range Ballistic Missiles 
(SRBMs) and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). Without going into 
classified details, suffice it to say that the sheer number and types of these threats 
grows [sic] daily and the nation needs to find a way to deal with them.”11 
As is the case with the ICBMs that they aim to develop, Iran and North Korea 
undoubtedly intend to create “strategic” effects with short-to-intermediate-
range weapons in their own neighborhoods. In some scenarios, they expect their 
ballistic-missile forces to generate concrete, operational-level military effects as 
well, particularly in antiaccess and area-denial contexts.
Iran and North Korea are not alone in leveraging this aspect of potential ballis-
tic-missile employment. China also is crafting an antiaccess/area-denial strategy 
for the western Pacific based in part on the operational-level use of ballistic mis-
siles. As underscored recently in these pages, “China seeks the capacity to find 
U.S. aircraft carriers roughly a thousand miles from the mainland and to attack 
them with homing ASBMs (antiship ballistic missiles).”12 The most prominent 
aspect of this threat is China’s development of the world’s first “carrier killer” 
ballistic missile, the DF-21D. Another commentator has declared, “The DF-21D 
is the ultimate carrier-killer missile.”13 
Indeed, as The Economist has pointed out, “The Pentagon has described Chi-
na’s programme as ‘the most active land-based ballistic- and cruise-missile pro-
gramme in the world.’ Missiles are good value. Compared with a fully equipped 
aircraft-carrier, which might cost $15 billion–20 billion, a missile costs about 
$1m. . . . And American strategists are closely watching an experimental anti-ship 
ballistic missile with a manoeuvrable warhead, which could make it hard for 
American fleets to approach the Chinese shore.”14 A January 2011 New York Times 
editorial captured the level of concern regarding China’s emerging capabilities:
Beijing’s drive to extend its military and territorial reach is making America’s close 
allies in the region nervous and raising legitimate questions about American diplo-
macy and future military procurement. The commander of America’s Pacific forces 
recently revealed that China could soon deploy a ballistic missile capable of threat-
ening American aircraft carriers in the region. The Pentagon has a long history of 
hyping the Chinese threat to justify expensive weapons purchases, and sinking well-
defended ships with ballistic missiles is notoriously hard. But what should rightly 
concern American military planners is not so much the missile but the new Chinese 
naval strategy behind it. China seems increasingly intent on challenging United States 
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naval supremacy in the western Pacific. At the same time it is aggressively pressing 
its claims to disputed offshore islands in the East and South China Seas. Washington 
must respond, carefully but firmly. The Pentagon must accelerate efforts to make 
American naval forces in Asia less vulnerable to Chinese missile threats by giving 
them the means to project their deterrent power from further offshore.15
Some would downplay the threat posed by China and the DF-21D missile, argu-
ing that—as a result of the “Walmart Factor” that intertwines the two economies
—state-on-state conflict with China is not likely.16 However, China needs only to 
make the likely cost to the United States of intervening in western Pacific affairs—
to counter Chinese threats against Taiwan or bullying of neighbors over disputed 
claims in the South China Sea—high enough to render intervention no longer a 
reasonable deterrent.17 Moreover, China’s increasing dependence on Mideast oil 
creates plausible scenarios in which it would export the DF-21D to countries like 
Iran. Given the marginal success of ongoing nonproliferation efforts, DF-21Ds 
could find their way to yet other governments or even to transnational or terror-
ist groups with animus toward the United States, its allies, or friends.
To counter the most pressing part of this spectrum of ballistic-missile threats—
states already possessing WMD-armed ballistic missiles—the United States has 
fielded an initial national-level BMDS, integrating land, sea, air, and space ele-
ments. The first priority of the BMDS implementation strategy—establishing 
a limited defensive capability against North Korean ballistic missiles—has largely 
been achieved, with Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC-3) batteries, the Ground-
Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, the forward-deployed AN/TPY-2 radar, 
and Aegis BMD ships for long-range search, cueing, and engagement. 
The Navy’s contribution, built around the Aegis weapon system, to U.S. ballistic-
missile defenses has grown in importance in recent years, even as national-level 
BMDS has expanded to encompass other potential threats. The Aegis BMD sys-
tem has been integrated with fleet and joint force war-fighting standards and 
BMDS command, control, battle-management, and communications (C2BMC) 
elements. Aegis BMD interoperates with ground-, air-, and space-based sensors 
and other in-theater assets, including the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) system. 
The Aegis weapon system’s adaptability has enabled the Navy to add improved 
hardware and software to successive Aegis “spiral” (phased) upgrades. The Aegis 
Combat System today consists of four major components: the AN/SPY-1 radar, 
the Aegis weapon system, the Mark 41 vertical-launching system (VLS), and 
the Standard surface-to-air missile family. Aegis BMD capability receives “block 
upgrades” every two years, increasing its capabilities at each step. The present 
configuration of Aegis BMD, Aegis 3.6, includes the BMD weapon system teamed 
with the advanced SM-3 Block IA missile. 
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The success of Aegis BMD arises from an acquisition strategy supported by a 
rigorous systems-engineering and integration approach and fueled by substantial 
and steady investment in baseline and upgraded system development. The Aegis 
weapon system represents nearly fifty years of research, development, testing, 
and real-world performance, and its missiles more than sixty years. All this un-
dergirds Aegis BMD. This success can be seen in the results of its test program, 
which as of late 2011 has involved twenty-six live firings at sea since January 
2002. These tests have become progressively more challenging and operationally 
realistic and have enjoyed unprecedented success: twenty-one hits in twenty-six 
shots, an 81 percent success rate, in spite of the fact that through 2011 the Aegis 
program accounted for only 10 percent of annual Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
budgets.18 
The twenty-fifth test—designated Flight Test Mission (FTM) 15—occurred 
on 15 April 2011, when the MDA conducted the first-ever “launch on remote” 
test of the system against an intermediate-range “separating target,” a warhead 
separating from its booster missile. In FTM-15 the guided-missile destroyer USS 
O’Kane (DDG 77), with a standard Aegis BMD system, fired a Standard Missile–3
Block IA missile in response to remote data provided by a forward-based AN/
TPY-2 radar. This pitted for the first time an in-service SM-3 Block IA mis-
sile against an intermediate-range (1,800–3,400 miles) modified Trident I/C-4 
ballistic-missile target, an LV-2. The demands of this test were well beyond Aegis 
BMD’s original design, which focused on short- and medium-range threats. The 
LV-2 had flown in two previous BMD live-fire tests but had not been hit—until 
FTM-15. 
Importantly, FTM-15 used technologies and systems that are at sea and in 
service today. There were no changes to O’Kane’s BMD suite for the test. More-
over, the success unveiled new possibilities for Aegis BMD using technologies and 
systems already available. Also important about FTM-15 is that it linked the ship 
to remote sensor data to increase coverage area and responsiveness. Once this ca-
pability is fully developed, interceptors—no longer constrained by the detection 
range of the Aegis radar against an incoming missile—can be launched sooner 
and fly farther.
The twenty-sixth Aegis BMD flight test, FTM-16, occurred on 1 September 
2011. The primary goal was to track and engage a separating ballistic-missile 
target with the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 Weapon System and the SM-3 Block IB missile, 
the block-upgrade successor of the SM-3 Block IA.19 FTM-16 was the first flight 
test of the Block IB. While the test yielded no intercept, USS Lake Erie (CG 70)
successfully detected and tracked the target and guided the SM-3. FTM-16 high-
lighted the difficulties and complexities of the ballistic defense mission. In accord 
with the Aegis “build a little, test a little, learn a lot” philosophy, the Navy and 
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the MDA will glean important information from FTM-16, incorporate it, and 
continue to advance Aegis BMD capabilities.
Aegis BMD’s accomplishments are even more impressive in light of the com-
plex technical challenges that all BMD systems must overcome. For example, 
THAAD went zero for six during the 1990s before achieving two hits. Then, after 
a five-year hiatus and redesign, the system achieved an eight-for-eight record. 
Likewise, the GMD system had eight successful intercepts in fifteen attempts. 
However, the two tests in January and December 2010 were failures; this per-
formance was behind the MDA decision to restructure the GMD test program. 
A “FOUNDATION OF GREATER COOPERATION” 
Aegis BMD functions as an integral node in the overall, integrated national BMDS 
but also can operate independently to defeat ballistic missiles. Furthermore, Ae-
gis BMD maintains this capability while also being able to carry out other naval 
warfare missions. This versatility makes Aegis BMD valuable as a component of 
an international effort to provide collective defense against ballistic missiles. The 
threat of WMD-armed ballistic missiles is no longer a U.S.-centric issue. During 
the past decade nations in Europe and Asia have increasingly looked for means 
to counter the emerging threat to their territories and forces. This presents new 
possibilities for the combined, coordinated, Aegis BMD enterprise.
The potential for a global BMD effort was highlighted in a 2009 report by 
the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense. It recommended limiting 
fixed, ground missile-defense deployments based on GMD in favor of expand-
ing theater/regional defenses centered on sea-based missile defenses (along with 
Aegis Ashore, land-based SM-3 missiles, and THAAD system radars). The report 
recommended, “Equip additional U.S. vessels with the Aegis anti-missile system. 
Encourage U.S. allies equipped with Aegis/SM to do the same.”20 
The Foundation: Aegis Abroad
The diffusion of Aegis BMD capability abroad is occurring quietly. Governments 
that have made naval force-structure investment decisions based primarily on 
inwardly focused national interests have discovered that their investments also 
enable them to combine their resources in collective defense. As the 2010 Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review acknowledged, 
Other allies already own or are working with the United States to acquire specific 
capabilities, such as naval vessels equipped with the Aegis defensive system that could 
be adapted to include a missile defense capability. . . . A primary U.S. emphasis is on 
ensuring appropriate burden sharing. The Administration recognizes that allies do 
not view the specifics of the missile threat in the same way, and do not have equal re-
sources to apply to this problem, but there is general recognition of a growing threat 
and the need to take steps now to address both existing threats and emerging ones.21 
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This effort to create a broad BMD enterprise builds on the current participa-
tion of allied navies in the Aegis program. This global effort started with a foreign 
military sales relationship with Japan, subsequently expanded to relationships 
with Australia and Korea, and now includes a commercial connection with Spain 
as well as an enterprise between Norway and Spain.22 Several other states have 
expressed interest in acquiring the Aegis weapon system and Aegis BMD. Im-
portantly, Australia and other countries that are acquiring the Aegis system are 
stipulating that the systems they buy must have the capability of adding BMD in 
the future.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was the first foreign navy to 
construct Aegis warships. The JMSDF as of late 2011 operated four Kongo-class 
destroyers; the lead ship of the class was commissioned in 1993. In 2000, the 
JMSDF won approval for two improved units, known as the Atago class; the lead 
ship of that class was commissioned in 2007.
Sharing, in light of an increasing regional threat, the U.S. interest in building 
ballistic-missile defenses, Japan decided in 2003 to upgrade its Kongo class with 
an Aegis BMD capability. U.S. foreign military sales upgraded all four ships ac-
cordingly, with SM-3 Block IA missiles. Japan subsequently decided to upgrade 
its Atago-class ships with Aegis BMD as well. That upgrade allows the JMSDF 
to meet the tenets of its New Defense Program Guidelines, which call for a total 
of six Aegis BMD-equipped ships to defend the country from missile threats, in 
conjunction with U.S. Navy warships.23 
U.S.-Japanese cooperation extends also to the SM-3 missile. The United States 
and Japan signed a memorandum of agreement in 1999 to cooperate in the 
development of the SM-3 Block IIA, with Japan contributing both funding and 
know-how. The Japanese technical contribution includes risk reduction in the 
areas of the kinetic kill vehicle, second-stage propulsion, and the nose cone. The 
success of the program led the U.S. Department of Defense to initiate talks aimed 
at urging Japan to relax its decades-long arms embargo and export the SM-3 
Block IIA to other countries, including U.S. European allies. In 2011, the Japanese 
government gave its assent to export the SM-3 Block IIA.24 This U.S./Japanese 
cooperation on Aegis BMD writ large and SM-3 Block IIA development specifi-
cally, as well as trilaterally among Japan, South Korea, and the United States, is 
increasingly evident in high-level Japanese publications, such as the 2011 Defense 
of Japan white paper, as well as in various conference and symposia reports where 
Japanese defense policy is discussed.25
Across the Sea of Japan, South Korea has announced plans to build six 5,600-
ton KDX-IIIA Aegis-equipped destroyers beginning in 2019 to complement the 
three Sejon-Daewan KDX-III Aegis destroyers that was in service by 2012. More-
over, in 2011 South Korea declared that it was establishing a defensive system to 
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combat air-breathing (that is, generally, cruise missile, either ramjet or turbojet 
powered) and ballistic-missile threats from North Korea. Scheduled to be in 
place by 2015, the Korea Air and Missile Defense system will be built around the 
capabilities inherent in its Aegis-equipped destroyers and its modified PAC-3 
ground-based interceptors.
The Aegis weapon system is becoming an antiair/BMD weapon of choice for 
other navies also. The Spanish navy in early 2012 operated four Aegis-equipped 
air-defense frigates of the Alvaro de Bazan (F100) class, with another under con-
struction. Spain’s interest in Aegis and its shipbuilding expertise have been “ex-
ported” to the Norwegian and Australian navies. In 2011, the Royal Norwegian 
Navy received the last of five frigates of the Fridtjof Nansen (F310) class—a some-
what austere but still capable version of the F100—built by Navantia shipyard in 
Ferrol, Spain. The Australian government likewise is partnering with Navantia 
to build three air-defense destroyers of the Hobart class at the ASC Shipbuilding 
facility in South Australia. 
Following in the path established by the U.S. Navy, non-U.S. Aegis operators 
have been taking steps to exploit the system’s BMD capabilities. The JMSDF 
has progressed farthest in this regard, closely integrating its activities with its 
American counterparts. The destroyer Kirishima was the first foreign warship 
to participate in a U.S. Aegis BMD flight test, in June 2006. Eighteen months 
later, during the JMSDF’s first flight-test mission, Kongo became the first ship 
of an allied navy to engage successfully a ballistic-missile target. Between 2007 
and 2010, four separate JMSDF ships launched SM-3 missiles at medium-range, 
separating-warhead targets.26 Spain too has evaluated the possibilities presented 
by Aegis BMD. The Spanish navy’s Mendez Nunez (F104), outfitted with BMD 
software, tracked a ballistic-missile target during a 2007 flight test.
The network framework of the Aegis enterprise enables other European na-
vies, those that do not operate Aegis warships, to join a broader, Aegis-centered 
naval BMD architecture. The Netherlands navy’s Tromp, a frigate fitted with a 
modified SMART-L surveillance radar and the Advanced Phased Array Radar 
(APAR), demonstrated this potential when it tracked a ballistic-missile target 
during a December 2006 Aegis BMD flight test. The German navy also operates 
three frigates fitted with SMART-L, APAR, and the Mark 41 VLS. Denmark is 
planning to build similarly equipped patrol frigates, suggesting another avenue 
by which BMD capability can migrate across NATO navies.
Aegis Ashore
The diffusion of Aegis capabilities globally was accelerated when the Barack 
Obama administration announced a new U.S. ballistic-missile defense policy 
in September 2009.27 President Obama’s decision upended the George W. Bush 
administration’s plan to place missile-defense radar sites and ground-based 
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interceptors in Eastern Europe, opting instead for a “Phased Adaptive Approach” 
(PAA)—a global sea- and land-based missile-defense capability centered initially 
on the Navy’s Aegis BMD system and the SM-3.28 The decision to make this major 
shift in U.S. ballistic-missile policy—deferring the planned fixed-site ground-
based system in Europe in favor of Aegis BMD afloat and ashore—was a direct 
response to the threat of short-to-intermediate-range Iranian ballistic missiles 
carrying WMD, slower than anticipated development of Iranian ICBMs, and a 
desire to engage Russia—which was vehemently opposed to GMD deployment 
in Eastern Europe—in BMD plans.29 
At the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, President Obama highlighted 
the importance of the Phased Adaptive Approach as well as the potential of Aegis 
BMD to undergird global partnerships:
We must strengthen the full range of capabilities that are needed to protect our 
people and prepare for the missions of tomorrow. . . . Another necessary alliance ca-
pability is missile defense of NATO territory, which is needed to address the real and 
growing threat from ballistic missiles. The Phased Adaptive Approach to European 
missile defense that I announced last year will provide a strong and effective defense 
of the territory and people of Europe and our deployed American forces. Moreover, 
it forms the foundation of greater collaboration—with a role for all allies, protection 
for all allies, and an opportunity to cooperate with Russia, which is also threatened by 
ballistic missiles.30
The PAA comprises four phases. In Phase 1 (2011), existing sea-based Aegis 
missile-defense ships and radars have been deployed to defend against short- and 
medium-range ballistic missiles potentially threatening southern Europe. On 7 
March 2011, USS Monterey (CG 61) left its home port of Norfolk, Virginia, for a 
six-month deployment to the Mediterranean as the first Aegis BMD ship to de-
ploy specifically in support of the EPAA.31 This historic deployment was widely 
reported in the national and international media.
In PAA phases 2 (2015), 3 (2018), and 4 (2020), the Aegis SM-3 missiles will 
be successively upgraded to provide coverage against medium- and intermediate-
range missiles. By Phase 4, the Block IIB variant of the SM-3 should have an 
intercept capability against ICBMs as well.32
Momentum had been growing in Europe to build an alliance-wide missile-
defense system compatible with Aegis BMD; Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s 
secretary general, declared, “Missile defense presents the greatest potential for 
enhancing our cooperation.”33 The issue of collective ballistic-missile defense 
was a major theme during the Lisbon summit, which approved a plan for Aegis-
enabled European BMD as a core element in NATO’s new strategic concept: 
“NATO will actively seek cooperation on missile defense with Russia and other 
Euro-Atlantic partners.”34 
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NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral James Stavridis, USN, noted 
that a plan to link the American PAA with a NATO missile-defense shield to pro-
vide a European theater-wide BMD shield is under development by U.S. Europe-
an Command.35 Well before the summit, NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic 
Missile Defence program had conducted tests with the U.S. C2BMC system, with 
the ultimate, long-sought goal of international command-and-control interop-
erability. All twenty-eight NATO allies were already engaged in discussions as 
to how to connect the European members’ short- and medium-range theater 
missile-defense systems via NATO to the U.S. long-range missile-defense system. 
AN AEGIS BMD FOCUS FOR THE GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIP
By early 2012, Aegis was deployed on eighty-eight ships, with another eighteen 
under construction or planned. The vast majority of these belong to the U.S. 
Navy, but the number of non-U.S. Aegis platforms is growing as well. Addition-
ally, more nations are buying or considering BMD capabilities for their Aegis-
equipped ships.
The value of encouraging the increased adoption of Aegis-like capabilities—as 
well as interoperability with existing Aegis platforms afloat and ashore—is clear. 
Even the current, somewhat circumscribed, distribution of Aegis assets constitutes 
a foundation for a potential “sensor/shooter” mix for a global ballistic-missile 
defense enterprise. The shooter component can be shared, as well as the part-
ners’ agreed-on rules of engagement. For example, if the United States and Japan 
agree to form a defensive sensor shield over Japan and U.S. forces surrounding 
Japan against a North Korean missile launch, this shield can be accompanied by 
a missile-defense strike capability against the North’s launch sites. The urgent 
need to deepen Japanese collaboration with the United States for missile defense 
in response to North Korea’s testing of nuclear weapons has been recognized by 
both governments.36 As South Korea proceeds along its current path, it too could 
well join the Aegis Afloat BMD partnership.
At the end of the day, sovereign interdependence and interoperability will 
remain core attributes of any Aegis global enterprise. The Aegis BMD system is 
already integrated and interoperable with other U.S. assets, and it will eventu-
ally be brought to the same standard with regard to coalition operations as well. 
Adoption of Aegis-type capabilities by allied militaries does not have to mean the 
exact replication of U.S. equipment and architecture, as demonstrated by South 
Korea’s concentration on a national, vice regional, missile-defense plan. At the 
technical level, however, reliance of non-U.S. assets on American hardware and 
software in systems like Aegis goes a long way toward syncing allied capabilities 
and interoperability. 
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In Europe, the decision as to whether and how to connect the European NATO 
allies’ short- and medium-range theater missile-defense systems to the U.S. long-
range missile defense system will be critical to the coherence of alliance-wide 
BMD. A high level of commitment to international partnership on the parts of 
both the United States and its allies—already evinced by ALTBMD and C2BMC 
shared situational-awareness tests—will encourage interoperability initiatives. 
This interoperability will, in turn, help ensure the success of the U.S. Phased 
Adaptive Approach. 
Ultimately, commitment to international partnership by the United States and 
its allies and friends to make Aegis BMD afloat a bulwark of global missile de-
fense will do much to prepare all concerned for combating the growing threat of 
ballistic missiles of all colors and hues. It also offers the strong potential—more 
than anything else has in the years since Admiral Mullen’s 2005 speech—to gird 
the Global Maritime Partnership for “high end” warfare. But this will not happen 
without leadership and stewardship at the highest level. 
TOWARD EXTRAORDINARY REWARDS 
Close cooperation in the area of Aegis BMD between the United States and Japan, 
possibly Korea, and potentially Australia does not in itself qualify as an “Aegis 
BMD Global Enterprise.” But to include European nations in an Aegis-afloat 
enterprise of capabilities approaching those planned for the ALTBMD/EPAA 
system would. But why would European nations, with defense budgets dwarfed 
by that of the United States, embark on such an enterprise? The reason is clear: 
NATO and the European governments have interests often well beyond the ter-
ritorial boundaries of the European continent. 
European navies are now deployed worldwide fulfilling the vision of a Global 
Maritime Partnership: supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting 
in Libya, conducting antipiracy patrols in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, and 
supporting humanitarian assistance operations around the world. There could be 
no more propitious time to begin to link more completely European allies in an 
Aegis BMD Global Enterprise, in much the same way the U.S. Navy is now linked 
to its Asia-Pacific partners in a high-end Aegis BMD Global Maritime Partner-
ship. Such an enterprise would enable these nations—with U.S. participation
—to deal with such compelling threats as China’s DF-21D “ship killer” ballistic 
missile, especially if this missile is exported to China’s friends. This creates an 
ideal opportunity to create a “high end” Global Maritime Partnership supported 
by Aegis BMD.
But it is unlikely that such a venture would succeed without ongoing U.S. lead-
ership, the same sort of leadership that is supporting sea-based Aegis BMD for 
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